



A Study on Secure Routing in Wireless Sensor Networks

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Abstract— We consider routing security in wireless sensor networks. Many sensor network routing protocols have been proposed, but none of them have been designed with security as a goal. We propose security goals for routing in sensor networks, show how attacks against ad-hoc and peer-to-peer networks can be adapted into powerful attacks against sensor networks, introduce two classes of novel attacks against sensor networks — sinkholes and HELLO floods, and analyze the security of all the major sensor network routing protocols. We describe crippling attacks against all of them and suggest countermeasures and design considerations. This is the first such analysis of secure routing in sensor networks.

Keywords— Spoofing, filtering, defense, wireless.

I. INTRODUCTION

Our focus is on routing security in wireless sensor networks. Current proposals for routing protocols in sensor networks optimize for the limited capabilities of the nodes and the application specific nature of the networks, but do not consider security. Although these protocols have not been designed with security as a goal, we feel it is important to analyze their security properties. When the defender has the liabilities of insecure wireless communication, limited node capabilities, and possible insider threats, and the adversaries can use powerful laptops with high energy and long range communication to attack the network, designing a secure routing protocol is non-trivial.

We present crippling attacks against all the major routing protocols for sensor networks. Because these protocols have not been designed with security as a goal, it is unsurprising they are all insecure. However, this is non-trivial to fix: it is unlikely a sensor network routing protocol can be made secure by incorporating security mechanisms after design has completed. Our assertion is that sensor network routing protocols must be designed with security in mind, and this is the only effective solution for secure routing in sensor networks.

We make five main contributions.

- We propose threat models and security goals for secure routing in wireless sensor networks.
- We introduce two novel classes of previously undocumented attacks against sensor networks: sinkhole attacks and HELLO floods.
- We show, for the first time, how attacks against ad-hoc wireless networks and peer-to-peer networks. These attacks are relevant to some ad-hoc wireless networks as well. They can be adapted into powerful attacks against sensor networks.

- We present the first detailed security analysis of all the major routing protocols and energy conserving topology maintenance algorithms for sensor networks.
- We describe practical attacks against all of them that would defeat any reasonable security goals.
- We discuss countermeasures and design considerations for secure routing protocols in sensor networks.

II. BACKGROUND

We use the term *sensor network* to refer to a heterogeneous system combining tiny sensors and actuators with general purpose computing elements. Sensor networks may consist of hundreds or thousands of low-power, low-cost nodes, possibly mobile but more likely at fixed locations, deployed en masse to monitor and affect the environment. For the remainder of this paper we assume that all nodes' locations are fixed for the duration of their lifetime. For concreteness, we target the Berkeley TinyOS sensor platform in our work. Because this environment is so radically different from any we had previously encountered, we feel it is instructive to give some background on the capabilities of the Berkeley TinyOS platform. A representative example is the Mica *mote2*, a small (several cubic inch) sensor/actuator unit with a CPU, power source, radio, and several optional sensing elements. The processor is a 4 MHz 8-bit Atmel ATMEGA103 CPU with 128 KB of instruction memory, 4 KB of RAM for data, and 512 KB of flash memory. The CPU consumes 5.5 mA (at 3 volts) when active, and two orders of magnitude less power when sleeping. The radio is a 916 MHz low-power radio from RFM, delivering up to 40 Kbps bandwidth on a single shared channel and with a range of up to a few dozen meters or so. The RFM radio consumes 4.8 mA (at 3 volts) in receive mode, up to 12 mA in transmit mode, and 5 μ A in sleep mode. An optional sensor board allows mounting of a temperature sensor, magnetometer, accelerometer, microphone, sounder, and other sensing elements. The whole device is powered by two AA batteries, which provide approximately 2850 mA hours at 3 volts.

Sensor networks often have one or more points of centralized control called *base stations*. A base station is typically a gateway to another network, a powerful data processing or storage center, or an access point for human interface. They can be used as a nexus to disseminate control information into the network or extract data from it. In some previous work on sensor network routing protocols, base stations have also been referred to as *sinks*.

Base stations are typically many orders of magnitude more powerful than sensor nodes. They might have workstation or laptop class processors, memory, and storage, AC power, and high bandwidth links for communication amongst themselves.

However, sensors are constrained to use lower-power, lower bandwidth, shorter-range radios, and so it is envisioned that the sensor nodes would form a multi-hop wireless network to allow sensors to communicate to the nearest base station. See Figure 2 for a picture illustrating a representative architecture for sensor networks. A base station might request a steady stream of data, such as a sensor reading every second, from nodes able to satisfy a query. We refer to such a stream as a *data flow* and to the nodes sending the data as *sources*.

In order to reduce the total number of messages sent and thus save energy, sensor readings from multiple nodes may be processed at one of many possible *aggregation points*. An aggregation point collects sensor readings from surrounding nodes and forwards a single message representing an aggregate of the values. Aggregation points are typically regular sensor nodes, and their selection is not necessarily static. Aggregation points could be chosen dynamically for each query or event, for example. It is also possible that every node in the network functions as an aggregation point, delaying transmission of an outgoing message until a sufficient number of incoming messages have been received and aggregated. Power management in sensor networks is critical. At full power, the Berkeley Mica mote can run for only two weeks or so before exhausting its batteries. Consequently, if we want sensor networks to last for years, it is crucial that they run at around a 1% duty cycle (or less). Similarly, since the power consumption of the radio is three orders of magnitude higher when transmitting or listening than when in sleep mode, it is crucial to keep the radio in sleep mode the overwhelming majority of the time. It is clear that we must discard many preconceptions about network security: sensor networks differ from other distributed systems in important ways. The resource-starved nature of sensor networks poses great challenges for security. These devices have very little computational power: public-key cryptography is so expensive as to be unusable, and even fast symmetric-key ciphers must be used sparingly. With only 4 KB of RAM, memory is a resource that must be husbanded carefully, so our security protocols cannot maintain much state. Also, communication bandwidth is extremely dear: each bit transmitted consumes about as much power as executing 800–1000 instructions [3], and as a consequence, any message expansion caused by security mechanisms comes at significant cost. Power is the scarcest resource of all: each milliamp consumed is one milliamp closer to death, and as a result, nearly every aspect of sensor networks must be designed with power in mind.

This leaves us with a very demanding environment. How can security possibly be provided under such tight constraints? Yet security is critical. With sensor networks being envisioned for use in critical applications such as building monitoring, burglar alarms, and emergency response, with the attendant lack of physical security for

hundreds of exposed devices, and with the use of wireless links for communications, these networks are at risk.




Fig.1. **Sensor network legend.** All nodes may use low power radio links, but only laptop-class adversaries and base stations can use low latency, high bandwidth links.

III SENSOR NETWORKS VS. AD-HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS

Wireless sensor networks share similarities with ad-hoc wireless networks. The dominant communication method in both is multi-hop networking, but several important distinctions can be drawn between the two. Ad-hoc networks typically support routing between any pair of nodes [4], [5], [6], [7], whereas sensor networks have a more specialized communication pattern. Most traffic in sensor networks can be classified into one of three categories:

- 1) **Many-to-one:** Multiple sensor nodes send sensor readings to a base station or aggregation point in the network.
- 2) **One-to-many:** A single node (typically a base station) multicasts or floods a query or control information to several sensor nodes.
- 3) **Local communication:** Neighboring nodes send localized messages to discover and coordinate with each other. A node may broadcast messages intended to be received by all neighboring nodes or unicast messages intended for a only single neighbor.

Nodes in ad-hoc networks have generally been considered to have limited resources, but as we have seen in Section II, sensor nodes are even more constrained. Of all of the resource constraints, limited energy is the most pressing. After deployment, many sensor networks are designed to be unattended for long periods and battery recharging or replacement may be infeasible or impossible. Nodes in sensor networks often exhibit trust relationships beyond those that are typically found in ad-hoc networks. Neighboring nodes in sensor networks often witness the same or correlated environmental events. If each node sends a packet to the base station in response, precious energy and bandwidth are wasted. To prune these redundant messages to reduce traffic and save energy, sensor networks require in-network processing, aggregation, and duplicate elimination. This often necessitates trust relationships between nodes that are not typically assumed in ad-hoc networks.




Fig. 2. A representative sensor network architecture.

IV ATTACKS ON SENSOR NETWORK ROUTING

Many sensor network routing protocols are quite simple, and for this reason are sometimes even more susceptible to attacks against general ad-hoc routing protocols. Most network layer attacks against sensor networks fall into one of the following categories:

- Spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information.
- Selective forwarding.
- Sinkhole attacks.
- Sybil attacks
- Wormholes
- HELLO flood attacks
- Acknowledgement spoofing

In the descriptions below, note the difference between attacks that try to manipulate user data directly and attacks that try to affect the underlying routing topology. We start with some general discussion of these types of attacks; in Section V, we show how these attacks may be applied to compromise routing protocols that have been proposed in the literature.

A. Spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information

The most direct attack against a routing protocol is to target the routing information exchanged between nodes. By spoofing, altering, or replaying routing information, adversaries may be able to create routing loops, attract or repel network traffic, extend or shorten source routes, generate false error messages, partition the network, increase end-to-end latency, etc.

B. Selective forwarding

Multi-hop networks are often based on the assumption that participating nodes will faithfully forward received messages.

In a selective forwarding attack, malicious nodes may refuse to forward certain messages and simply drop them, ensuring that they are not propagated any further. A simple form of this attack is when a malicious node behaves like a black hole and refuses to forward every packet she sees. However, such an attacker runs the risk that neighboring nodes will conclude that she has failed and decides to seek another route. A more subtle form of this attack is when an adversary selectively forwards packets.

C. Sinkhole attacks

In a sinkhole attack, the adversary's goal is to lure nearly all the traffic from a particular area through a compromised node, creating a metaphorical sinkhole with the adversary at the center. Because nodes on, or near, the path that packets follow have many opportunities to tamper with application data, sinkhole attacks can enable many other attacks (selective forwarding, for example). Sinkhole attacks typically work by making a compromised node look especially attractive to surrounding nodes with respect to the routing algorithm. For instance, an adversary could spoof or replay an advertisement for an extremely high quality route to a base station. Some protocols might actually try to verify the quality of route with end-to-end acknowledgements containing reliability or latency information. One motivation for mounting a sinkhole attack is that it makes selective forwarding trivial. By ensuring that all traffic in the targeted area flows through a compromised node, an adversary can selectively suppress or modify packets originating from any node in the area. It should be noted that the reason sensor networks are particularly susceptible to sinkhole attacks is due to their specialized communication pattern. Since all packets share the same ultimate destination (in networks with only one base station), a compromised node needs only to provide a single high quality route to the base station in order to influence a potentially large number of nodes.

D. The Sybil attack

In a Sybil attack [2], a single node presents multiple identities to other nodes in the network. The Sybil attack can significantly reduce the effectiveness of fault-tolerant schemes such as distributed storage [24], disparity [25] and multipath [26] routing, and topology maintenance [27], [28]. Replicas, storage partitions, or routes believed to be using disjoint nodes could in actuality be using a single adversary presenting multiple identities. Sybil attacks also pose a significant threat to geographic routing protocols. Location aware routing often requires nodes to exchange coordinate information with their neighbors to efficiently route geographically addressed packets. It is only reasonable to expect a node to accept but a single set of coordinates from each of its neighbors, but by using the Sybil attack an adversary can "be in more than one place at once".

E. Wormholes

In the wormhole attack [1], an adversary tunnels messages received in one part of the network over a low latency link and replays them in a different part. The simplest instance of this attack is a single node situated between two other nodes forwarding messages between the two of them. However, wormhole attacks more commonly involve two distant malicious nodes colluding to understate their distance from each other by relaying packets along an out-of-bound channel available only to the attacker. Figure 5 shows an example of a wormhole being used to create a sinkhole. Wormholes can also be used simply to convince two distant nodes that they are neighbors by relaying packets between the two of them. Wormhole attacks would likely be used in combination with selective forwarding or eavesdropping. Detection is potentially difficult when used in conjunction with the Sybil attack.

F. HELLO flood attack

We introduce a novel attack against sensor networks: the HELLO flood. Many protocols require nodes to broadcast HELLO packets to announce themselves to their neighbors, and a node receiving such a packet may assume that it is within (normal) radio range of the sender. This assumption may be false: a laptop-class attacker broadcasting routing or other information with large enough transmission power could convince every node in the network that the adversary is its neighbor.

An adversary does not necessarily need to be able to construct legitimate traffic in order to use the HELLO flood attack. She can simply re-broadcast overhead packets with enough power to be received by every node in the network. HELLO floods can also be thought of as one-way, broadcast wormholes.

Note: "Flooding" is usually used to denote the epidemic-like propagation of a message to every node in the network over a multi-hop topology. In contrast, despite its name, the HELLO flood attack uses a single hop broadcast to transmit a message to a large number of receivers.

G. Acknowledgement spoofing

Several sensor network routing algorithms rely on implicit or explicit link layer acknowledgements. Due to the inherent broadcast medium, an adversary can spoof link layer acknowledgements for "overheard" packets addressed to neighboring nodes. Goals include convincing the sender that a weak link is strong or that a dead or disabled node is alive. For example, a routing protocol may select the next hop in a path using link reliability. Artificially reinforcing a weak or dead link is a subtle way of manipulating such a scheme. Since packets sent along weak or dead links are lost, an adversary can effectively mount a selective forwarding attack using acknowledgement spoofing by encouraging the target node to transmit packets on those links.

V ATTACKS ON SPECIFIC SENSOR NETWORK PROTOCOLS

All of the proposed sensor network routing protocols are highly susceptible to attack. Adversaries can attract or repel traffic flows, increase latency, or disable the entire network with sometimes as little effort as sending a single packet. In this section, we survey the proposed sensor network routing protocols and highlight the relevant attacks.

A. TinyOS beaconing

The TinyOS beaconing protocol constructs a breadth first spanning tree rooted at a base station. Periodically the base station broadcasts a route update. All nodes receiving the update mark the base station as its parent and rebroadcast the update. The algorithm continues recursively with each node marking its parent as the first node from which it hears a routing update during the current *time epoch*. All packets received or generated by a node are forwarded to its parent (until they reach the base station).

Attacks: The TinyOS beaconing protocol is highly susceptible to attack. Since routing updates are not authenticated, it is possible for any node to claim to be a base station and become the destination of all traffic in the network (see Figure 5).




Fig.3. A representative topology constructed using TinyOS beaconing with a single base station.

Authenticated routing updates will prevent an adversary from claiming to be a base station, but a powerful laptop class adversary can still easily wreak havoc. An adversary interested in eavesdropping on, modifying, or suppressing packets in a particular area can do so by mounting a combined wormhole/sinkhole attack.




Fig. 4. An adversary spoofing a routing update from a base station in TinyOS beaconing.

The adversary first creates a wormhole between two colluding laptop-class nodes, one near the base station and one near the targeted area. The first node forwards (authenticated) routing updates to the second through the wormhole, who participates normally in the protocol and rebroadcasts the routing update in the targeted area. Since the "worm-holed" routing update will likely reach the targeted area considerably faster than it normally would have through multi-hop routing, the second node will create a large routing sub-tree in the targeted area with itself as the root. As seen in Figure 6, all traffic in the targeted area will be channeled through the wormhole, enabling a potent selective forwarding attack. If a laptop-class adversary has a powerful transmitter, it can use a HELLO flood attack to broadcast a routing update loud enough to reach the entire network, causing every node to mark the adversary as its parent. Most nodes will be likely out of normal radio range of both a true base station and the adversary. As shown in Figure 7, the network is crippled: the majority of nodes are stranded, sending packets into oblivion. Due to the simplicity of this protocol, it is unlikely there exists a simple extension to recover from this attack. A node that realizes its parent is not actually in range (say by using link layer acknowledgements) has few options short of flooding every packet.




Fig. 5. A laptop-class adversary using a wormhole to create a sinkhole in TinyOS beaconing.

Each of its neighbors will likely have the adversary marked as its parent as well. Routing loops can easily be created by mote-class adversaries spoofing routing updates. Suppose an adversary can determine that node A and node B are within radio range of each other.




Fig. 6. HELLO flood attack against TinyOS beaconing.

An adversary can send a forged routing update to node B with a spoofed source address indicating it came from node A. Node B will then mark node A as its parent and rebroadcast the routing update. Node A will then hear the routing update from node B and mark B as its parent. Messages sent to either A or B will be forever forwarded in a loop between the two of them.

B. Directed diffusion

Directed diffusion [29] is a data-centric routing algorithm for drawing information out of a sensor network. Base stations flood interests for named data, setting up gradients within the network designed to draw events (i.e., data matching the interest). Nodes able to satisfy the interest disseminate information along the reverse path of interest propagation. Nodes receiving the same interest from multiple neighboring nodes may propagate events along the corresponding multiple links. Interests initially specify a low rate of data flow, but once a base station starts receiving events it will reinforce one (or more) neighbor in order to request higher data rate events. This process proceeds recursively until it reaches the nodes generating the events, causing them to generate events at a higher data rate. Alternatively, paths may be negatively reinforced as well. There is a multipath variant of directed diffusion [30] as well. After the primary dataflow is established using

positive reinforcements, alternate routes are recursively established with maximal disjointness by attempting to reinforce neighbors not on the primary path.

Attacks: Due to the robust nature of flooding, it may be difficult for an adversary to prevent interests from reaching targets able to satisfy them. However, once sources begin to generate data events, an adversary attacking a data flow might have one of four goals:

Suppression: Flow suppression is an instance of denial of service. The easiest way to suppress a flow is to spoof negative reinforcements.

Cloning: Cloning a flow enables eavesdropping. After an adversary receives an interest flooded from a legitimate base station, it can simply replay that interest with herself listed as a base station. All events satisfying the interest will now be sent to both the adversary and the legitimate base station.

Path influence: An adversary can influence the path taken by a data flow by spoofing positive and negative reinforcements and bogus data events.

VI. ULTIMATE LIMITATIONS OF SECURE MULTI-HOP ROUTING

An ultimate limitation of building a multi-hop routing topology around a fixed set of base stations is that those nodes within one or two hops of the base stations are particularly attractive for compromise. After a significant number of these nodes have been compromised, all is lost. This indicates that clustering protocols like LEACH where cluster-heads communicate directly with a base station may ultimately yield the most secure solutions against node compromise and insider attacks. Another option may be to have a randomly rotating set of "virtual" base stations to create an overlay network. After a set of virtual base stations have been selected, a multi-hop topology is constructed using them. The virtual base station then communicate directly with the real base stations. The set of virtual base stations should be changed frequently enough to make it difficult for adversaries to choose the "right" nodes to compromise.

VII. CONCLUSION

Secure routing is vital to the acceptance and use of sensor networks for many applications, but we have demonstrated that currently proposed routing protocols for these networks are insecure. We leave it as an open problem to design a sensor network routing protocol that satisfies our proposed security goals. Link layer encryption and authentication mechanisms may be a reasonable first approximation for defense against mote-class outsiders, but cryptography is not enough to defend against laptop-class adversaries and insiders: careful protocol design is needed as well.

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